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Ethics; Pregnancy; Teratogenicity; Trials; Medications; Protocols; Informed consent Summary Introduction: The bioethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice, complemented by ethics committee evaluation, define conduct of clinical trials of anti-epileptic medications (AEM). Background information: Increased teratogenicity for offspring of women with epilepsy is presented in both lay and scientific literature. Specific drugs--older generation: Teratogenicity of phenobarbitone (PB), phenytoin (PHT), valproate (VPA) and carbamazepine (CBZ) is acknowledged, with drugs, such as trimethadione, being removed from the market because of teratogenicity. Specific drugs--new generation: Insufficient data allowed definitive commentary concerning teratogenicity of newer AEM, such as lamotrigine (LTG), gabapentin (GBP), tiagabine (TGB) or levetiracetam (LEV). All those suggestions favour some over others with specific AEM combinations being questioned. Pregnancy registries: Lack of information sporn AEM-specific plus national and international birth registries which endorse VPA, CBZ and LTG dose related concerns. Conflict of interest: Competing influences of AEM and epilepsy-specific factors need delineation although appear more teratogenetic than does epilepsy alone. Clinical trials: Most trials focus upon refractory epilepsy with potentially enhanced risks. Informed consent demands discussion of possible teratogenicity and exclusion of women unwilling to practice adequate contraception. Discussion: Trials must respect legal and ethical dictates including the exclusion of women unwilling to practice reliable contraception. Automatic exclusion from a trial, subsequent to confirmed pregnancy, is unlikely to protect the foetus as potential for teratogenicity already has occurred. Autonomy should empower Introduction ''. . . Prudence, temperance, justice and courage are often named as the four cardinal virtues from the writings of Plato and Aristotle, and faith, hope, and charity, as those of modern theological writings . . .''.
1 Despite this theological backdrop, practical wisdom must play an integral component within the debate regarding ethical considerations concerning health care delivery. 2 More than a decade ago, Beauchamp and Childress, American ethicists who adopted different ethical paradigms, one a utilitarian and the other a deontologist, agreed that the four basic principles of bioethics should be: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. 3 This endorsed and reinforced the views of the British doctor and ethicist, Gillon, from a decade earlier with these basic tenets described as: beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy and justice. 4 Simply put, these concepts are: respect for an individual's right for self-determination; the principle of 'doing good' and offering the best of care with respect for duty of care; avoiding doing harm if practicable or alternatively minimising any harm to be encountered; and a proper distribution of the benefit to burden ratio which aims at achieving optimal outcomes. One of the safeguards, designed to protect this balance of potentially conflicting expectations, is the use of an intermediary in the form of a Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC). The role of the HREC has been adopted and incorporated into the conduct of clinical research which must respect ethical issues. 1 Reverend Little 5 has eloquently demonstrated his perceptions of the pressures imposed by researchers in their search for novel and more efficacious treatments as contrasted with the evaluation of the risks to which the individual subjects can or should be exposed.
It is apparent that the proper balance of ethical considerations needs to be the primary concern for any investigator who is involved in clinical research. Even allowing for the incorporation of an HREC, within this process, does not eliminate the need for in-depth reflection by all concerned in clinical research, particularly if that involves human subjects.
Such deliberation was the motivating force driving the arguments and developments contained within this paper which focuses upon the inclusion of pregnant women within clinical trials of antiepileptic medications (AEMs). What follows is a review of the existing knowledge as a foundation upon which to consider such inclusion.
General background information
Standard textbooks which review the relationship of women and epilepsy [6] [7] [8] acknowledge the increased risk of teratogenicity for the offspring of women with epilepsy whether they are, or are not, on medication. Double the rate of major malformations is acknowledged for children born to mothers with epilepsy 9 as is a similar increase in minor abnormalities. 9 Information sheets posted on the internet indicate that there is a 1.5-2% increase of significant abnormality at birth if the women has epilepsy, even if she is seizure-free and off medication during the pregnancy, over women in the general population. This same website goes on to say ''. . . status epilepticus . . . is . . . potentially fatal for both mother and child . . . This is why women with epilepsy discovering themselves to be unexpectedly pregnant prospective parents to decide continued trial participation consequent to detailed informed consent without coercion. All options demand review, including responsibility to future AEM users. # 2006 British Epilepsy Association. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
should never suddenly stop their medication . . .''.
10
The same source of public information cites the risk of abnormality in the children born to women with epilepsy as increasing from 4 to 7% if the mother is taking a single AEM at the time of conception.
10 This rises to 15% if she is on two AEMs (with some AEM combinations leading to a 50% risk). 10 This threat is maximal in the first 56 days of gestation 6, 10 with the danger after 4 months gestation thought to be very low. 10 The web-page emphasises that, ''. . . the danger period starts before the woman knows she is pregnant . . .''.
Broad commentary regarding increased risk of malformation in the offspring of mothers with epilepsy is not restricted to lay publications [11] [12] [13] although Holmes et al. 13 did not find a higher frequency of abnormalities in the 98 infants born to mothers with epilepsy who were not taking AEMs as compared with the general population. Holmes et al. 13 did find an increase in malformations reflecting the number of AEMs being taken by the mother thereby confirming earlier data from Kaneko et al. 14 
Morrell
15 suggested that reliance on polypharmacy, with multiple AEMs, may be indicative of more difficult to manage epilepsy thereby suggesting that the increased risk of malformation may be multifactorial thus questioning an epilepsy-specific factor. It could reflect the severity of the epilepsy, drug-to-drug interactions, increased induction of the cytrochrome P450 system in the liver, increased effects of AEM metabolites or simply the nature of the epilepsy itself. 15 The role of folate as a protective agent, especially with regards to neural tube defects, remains to be confirmed. 16 
Specific drugs--older generation
Fear of gestational effects of specific AEMs is not new. Melchior et al. examined the placental transfer of phenobarbitone (PB) almost four decades ago. 17 PB teratogenicity has been well recognised for many years. 18 The foetal hydantoin syndrome, as may be associated with the use of phenytoin (PHT), was well recognised over three decades ago. [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] The prospect of foetopathy has actually led to the removal of specific AEMs from the marketplace. Perhaps the most memorable of these has been the rise and fall of trimethadione. [25] [26] [27] The ''trimethadione syndrome'' included deformities of craniofacies, cardiovascular system, trunk, neck, urogenital system and skeletal system. 28 By the 1980's sodium valproate (VPA) was well recognised as a cause of foetopathy, particularly with regards to neural tube defects. [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] Around this same time carbamazepine (CBZ) was also attracting attention for its capacity to cause birth defects, including neural tube defects. 35, 36 There remains conflicting data which suggests that drugs such as CBZ, oxcarbazepine (OXC) and PHT do not pose increased risk of malformation which is largely restricted to VPA. 37 Other studies have impugned specific AEM combinations such as VPA plus CBZ or PHT with primidone (PRM) plus PB. 14 
Specific drugs--new generation of AEM
Of the newer generation of AEMs, lamotrigine (LTG) has been investigated and deemed to be much safer than are the older generation of AEM, 38, 39 especially with exposure in the first trimester. Much of the data relative to the newer AEMs are too brief to draw any real conclusions.
A perfect example of this is the 27 pregnancies encountered in clinical trials with tiagabine (TGB) although even based on these small data there appears an increase of problems in the offspring of women treated with TGB. 40 Similarly the finding of no adverse events from 11 pregnancies amongst women on gabapentin (GBP) are too few to allow any concrete conclusions although on these tiny numbers it would appear that GPB is safer than is TGB. 41 The report of 51 pregnancies involving GBP is still too small to draw any hard and fast opinions although the data do suggest rates of perinatal problems and malformations to be less than, or similar to, those encountered in the general population or in women with epilepsy not on treatment. 42 Equally small and essentially non-interpretable data are provided for other newer generation AEM, such as levetiracetam (LEV). 43 Of the 23 pregnancies reported with LEV, a third (nine) resulted in healthy offspring for 8 women (one, on combination of LEV and PHT, had twins). A woman on the combination of LEV-CBZ-PB gave birth to a child with tetralogy of Fallot. 43 What this case reveals is that it is impossible to discern which of the AEMs was responsible, if any were, for such a malformation.
Pregnancy registers in epilepsy
Acknowledging that small numbers of patients result in inconclusive data, there has been a push to develop specific AEM registries as well as national and international birth registries. 38, 39, 42, [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] It is still too early to make any definitive commentary regarding the newer AEM although the findings of many of the registries echo data that has been known for some time, namely that under therapeutic conditions VPA may be regarded as considerably teratogenic and all other AEM are weakly so. 38, 49, 51 More recent information has identified a dose relationship with malformations with LTG and CBZ in addition to VPA. 52 
Conflict of opinion
Concurrent with this debate regarding the effects of specific medications, the role of epilepsy itself, as a cause of teratogenicity, is still being explored. 24, 53 Even the relatives of those with epilepsy have been assessed for malformations. 54 As has already been stated, both in the lay literature and in the scientific press, it is still not certain that the AEMs are the sole cause for foetopathy in the offspring of women with epilepsy. It is accepted that the choice of AEM is dictated by the type of epilepsy. VPA remains the principal choice for the treatment of generalised epilepsy and hence one cannot totally exclude the possibility that some maternal epilepsy related characteristic may predispose these offspring to malformation or developmental problems. 16 It is also argued that tonic-clonic status epilepticus may evoke very serious consequences for the foetal brain. 55 There is also a suggestion that partial seizures, with focal epilepsy, may cause negative consequences for the foetus. 56 Affects on the foetus are not restricted to brain function during convulsive seizures, cardiac consequences have been reported. 57 Convulsive seizures have been shown to cause lactic acidosis, the consequences of which are unclear for the foetus. 58 Previous research suggested that maternal seizures, occurring during pregnancy, did have an association with increased risk of specific cognitive dysfunction. 59 More recently there have been reports that the experience of five or more convulsive seizures, during pregnancy, was associated with an increase in cognitive dysfunction for verbal intelligence. 60 Single case reports have also identified issues such as intracranial haemorrhage in utero as a consequence of nocturnal seizures. 61 Others have attempted to review these questions, regarding the effects of seizures, with inconclusive findings. 13 Hauser and Hesdorffer, in a comprehensive review of the epidemiological data wrote, ''. . . It is unclear whether seizures or anti-epileptic drugs are associated with defect among offspring . . .''.
28 They further reviewed the data to show that malformations for the offspring born to women who had seizures during pregnancy were higher whether or not the women were treated with AEM, although this figure was significantly increased where AEMs were prescribed. 28 
Clinical trials
Subjects recruited for inclusion into clinical trials represent those in whom current therapies have either been inadequate or preferable option in de novo patients. Initial trials used add-on methodologies, usually with randomised controlled protocols. Only with proof of concept are de novo studies contemplated and only then if it is seriously anticipated that the experimental AEM may offer a better option.
Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice (GCP) dictate that patients should be advised of potential reproductive toxicity and mutagenicity as is known at the time of the study. 62 In accordance with GCP it is the investigator's responsibility to gain informed consent to undertake the study with each patient/ subject being fully informed, including ''. . . The reasonably foreseeable risks of or inconveniences to the subject and, when applicable, to an embryo, foetus or nursing infant . . .''. 63 GCP also requires that the investigator must advise each subject of ''. . . The foreseeable circumstances and/or reasons under which the subject's participation in the trial may be terminated . . .''.
63
The Helsinki Declaration 64 enshrines the ethical ethos of protecting the patient, namely non-maleficence and beneficence. It essentially codifies the concepts cited above in the introductory discussion of ethics.
It has long been accepted that there may well be conflict between ethical and legal considerations within any given set of circumstances and this is particularly apparent within the concept of clinical drug trials. 65 Where such conflict exists, the National Health and Medical Research Council (NH & MRC) guidelines confirm that the researcher should respect the legal demands. 66 The NH & MRC guidelines go on to say that where ethical expectations eclipse minimal legal standard then researchers should venerate those higher principles which still recognise legal demands. 66 
Discussion
The information which is set out above has established the framework within which to consider the involvement of pregnant women within clinical trials of new AEMs. One should never lose sight of the need to behave in an ethical manner within the boundaries defined both in the introductory section, [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] namely the principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice, as well as respect for the principles set out in the section dealing with clinical trials. [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] Concurrent with these foundations of ethical behaviour one must not ignore legal obligations to protect both the women with epilepsy and her prospective offspring. 65, 66 GCP and investigator obligations [62] [63] [64] demand that women who are fertile and at risk of consequences of exposure to experimental AEMs must be warned of the risks posed to pregnancy. This clearly translates into discussion of potential teratogenicity. It follows that non-maleficence would support the exclusion of such women from recruitment to clinical trials if they are not prepared to practice effective contraception.
There cannot be debate that what amounts to considerable ignorance of the potential for teratogenicity [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] places the mother and offspring at inherent risk of malformation, or subtle defects, which could best be averted by preventing a pregnancy occurring during the time of exposure to an experimental agent. While drug interactions between AEMs has been considered 15 it most likely would be impossible to totally exclude the capacity for there also to be an interaction between an experimental AEM and the oral contraceptive hormone pill. 67 Thus conceivable failure of contraception should also be discussed prior to obtaining informed consent for a potentially fertile woman to be recruited into a trial. Non-maleficence requires that these issues be openly addressed and the subject given every opportunity to decline entry into the trial.
It is hard to conceive of a situation where potential for pregnancy, within a clinical trial of an experimental AEM, is openly encouraged prior to recruitment. The debate to follow recognises this position. It endorses the posture of actively discouraging women who are wanting to become pregnant, or who either are pregnant or breastfeeding, from inclusion within such studies. It is accepted that such circumstances constitute valid grounds for exclusion from recruitment into trials of experimental AEMs.
The divergence occurs and the wrangle emerges for female subjects, who clearly understood the inherent risks, agreed to practice adequate contraception prior to inclusion into the study but who still became pregnant while within the trial. The fact that the female subject understood the fundamental dangers is encapsulated in her signing of the informed consent, presumably after full consultation and provision of HREC approved documentation outlining both the uncertainty and the basis for consent. 65 The whole tenet of such procedures is to guarantee that the inclusion of women of potential childbearing capacity are advised of the possible hazards within a relative vacuum of knowledge to ensure that they do not become pregnant. As has already been stated, those patients included within clinical trials of AEM are usually those patients with more difficult to manage and poorly controlled epilepsy, in whom the experimental AEM is often added to one or more of the existing AEM already taken by the patient. The information provided has demonstrated that the chance for teratogenicity increases with polypharmacy 10,13-15,28 and thus it is highly probable that add-on clinical trials of AEM amplify the opportunity for malformations.
It is also apparent that those who satisfy inclusion criteria have been selected because of their difficult to control epilepsy. This translates into an increased intrinsic propensity for seizures to occur during pregnancy. The data provided have suggested that such seizures, especially convulsive episodes or even worse, status epilepticus, do carry imminent ability to adversely affect the foetus.
10, 15, 55, [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] This assumes increased relevance for the woman who has achieved seizure control, as a consequence of exposure to an experimental AEM whilst in a trial, and who has subsequently become pregnant but in whom the sponsor may demand immediate withdrawal from study medication. It is acknowledged that it is possible that a patient has become seizurefree while in the placebo arm of a comparative trial but if this were to be the case then no ethical issue emerges as it is assumed that the placebo is inert. Withdrawal, consequent to effective intervention, would undoubtedly enhance risk of seizures during the pregnancy 10 and the possibility of status epilepticus, 10 with possible serious adverse consequence to the foetus, 10,55,56,59-61 which cannot be ignored. Parallel with this argument is the capacity for experimental AEM to interact with existing AEM thereby both compounding and confounding the possibility of malformations in the offspring. One should also not ignore the risk of instability to seizure control following withdrawal of medications within the context of potential interactions. There may be both pharmacokinetic and pharmodynamic effects on both the epilepsy and the patient. Were there unequivocal answers to these issues then there would be little need to conduct the type of clinical trial being undertaken. It follows that there cannot be clear knowledge of the repercussions that may ensue following withdrawal of an experimental AEM within this context.
It has already been demonstrated that long established AEMs have teratogenicity and it is the lack of experience with the newer AEMs, within the context of pregnancy, that is the real reason why there is no definitive answer to their potential for harm. [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] It is arguable that there is no real difference to the clinical use of a new AEM in open clinical practice, as compared with its use in clinical trials, namely that ethical conduct requires the clinician to actively warn the woman against becoming pregnant, essentially because of a lack of knowledge about potential teratogenicity. [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] This position has been reinforced within trial protocol which positively excludes patients as part of the study design who want to become, or who are, pregnant or breastfeeding. Where the debate emerges is the prospect of denial of autonomy and justice that ensues for the woman who has inadvertently become pregnant while already participating within the conduct of a trial. Exclusion from further participation in the trial removes her capacity to decide her own future and that of her unborn child.
By the time that the woman discovers that she is pregnant, she is well into, or even through, the first trimester of the pregnancy. The above data has suggested that the first 56 days translate into the maximal risk for the foetus 10,28 and hence, by the time the woman knows she is pregnant, the foetal consequences have most likely already occurred. Thus denial of access to further experimental AEM is unlikely to protect the foetus which has already been exposed. One could argue that the fate of the pregnancy has already been determined by the time the pregnancy has been confirmed. Within this context one should respect the wishes of the mother and father of the unborn child.
The imposition of immediate withdrawal from the experimental AEM may not represent the optimal decision. There are a number of alternatives which should be canvassed, such as elective termination of the pregnancy; continuation of the experimental AEM and the realisation of the birth based on the current regimen; maintenance of the pregnancy without further exposure to the experimental AEM; or in those cases where the experimental AEM has achieved previously unachievable seizure-freedom, withdrawal of other AEMs, with proven teratogenicity, while continuing monotherapy with the experimental AEM.
The autonomy of the experimental subject would demand that the patient has the right for informed self-determination in which she, plus her partner, make the decision based on the best advice which the investigator and/or sponsor, of the trial can offer. To force a decision upon the subject is to deny the basis of willingness to be a subject within a trial, namely that of informed consent which is based on the best available information. For the sponsor of a trial to claim legal imperative of duty of care to exclude the patient from further exposure to the experimental AEM is also to deny both autonomy and the very likely scenario that if damage is to occur it has already happened.
It is imperative to reiterate that it is not only acceptable but also advisable to actively dissuade potentially pregnant women from participating within clinical trials of AEM. [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] Some may argue that even such exclusion is debatable but protection of the potential offspring, in the face of possible harm, remains mandatory from the perspective of the non-malevolence principle. Conversely, once the female subject is aware of her pregnancy, such protection has been obviated and the principles of autonomy and self-determination and justice assume priority. Under these considerations the female patient who is pregnant deserves the right to provide informed decision-making in the light of all available information rather than having such right usurped by those who are conducting the trial. It must be recognised that initial warning of potential risks of pregnancy should have been part of the original informed consent to participate in the trial. There is no argument proffered to restrict exclusion of such candidates from recruitment into such trials if only on the basis of non-maleficence. What is proposed is to empower women who have inadvertently become pregnant, while participating within such a trial, to decide how they would like to proceed. This paper argues forcefully that it is inappropriate to automatically impose exclusion from the trial for such patients should they, upon full and comprehensive reflection, elect to continue within the protocol.
A final issue for consideration regarding the involuntary removal of such subjects from clinical trials, is the question of the ethical obligations for future women who may later be exposed to the AEM. Once experimental trials have concluded and the AEM is freely available to the general population there will be absolutely no data with which to advise prospective patients. Such availability of the new AEM will occur within a virtual vacuum of knowledge and merely postpone the inevitable, as was encountered with trimethadione, [25] [26] [27] [28] should the experimental AEM pose unacceptable risks. At no time will a pregnancy be more closely scrutinised or monitored than will happen within the rigorous dictates of a clinical trial. Such scrutiny may offer a unique opportunity to better understand pharmacokinetic, physiological and pharmacological interactions should the subject elect to continue within a trial, consequent to full disclosure and informed consent.
It could be suggested that such pregnancies, while representing unequivocal protocol violations, should be allowed to proceed should the subject so elect following further informed consent. They should be monitored with the most stringent predetermined protocol procedures if the prospective parents elect to continue with the pregnancy under the aegis of the clinical trial. Such policy would allow patient autonomy while at the same time respecting the utilitarian ethical paradigm which strives for the greatest good for the most people. It must be emphasised that this is only practical if there is absolutely no hint of coercion, within the decision-making process, for the prospective parents to continue within the trial.
In conclusion, this debate would suggest that it is unethical to unilaterally enforce withdrawal of women who become pregnant while participating within clinical trials of experimental AEM. They both deserve and require full and open discussion of all the known facts to respect their autonomy in the decision-making process. At no time should there be consideration of anything other than their best interests, such that beneficence is respected, and there should never be coercion to continue with a trial against a subject's wishes. Justice demands that women who become pregnant within clinical trials have the right to decide their own future because the data are insufficiently clear to make an absolute decision to overcome any concept of non-maleficence once the pregnancy has been confirmed.
